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THE SOCIAL COST OF FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS
Urska Velikonja*
ABSTRACT
Policy makers, regulators, and academics have traditionally looked for
the harm from securities fraud in the easy-to-study financial markets.
However, by doing so, they have missed the significantly larger social
welfare losses caused by securities fraud that fall outside financial markets.
False financial disclosures, which are the most common variant of
securities fraud, distort real economic decisions that firms, their rivals,
suppliers, vendors, lenders, and workers make, thus distorting markets for
inputs and outputs. When the fraud is revealed, every party affected makes
costly adjustments. Many fraud-committing firms file for bankruptcy. Their
rivals face doubts, called contagion. All firms must adjust their business
operations to the new (accurate) information, and they often pass on the
cost to their employees, suppliers, and customers. Significantly, the cost to
non-shareholders dwarfs that suffered by shareholders.
As a result, securities regulation and enforcement predicated on the
assumption that financial misrepresentations harm only investors will result
in worse disclosures and more fraud than is socially optimal. Because the
cost of fraudulent disclosures is dispersed and may be difficult to quantify
with sufficient precision, private remedies against fraud are inevitably
ineffective. Instead, honest disclosures have the characteristics of a public
good. And so, public regulation directed at prevention and early detection,
coupled with public enforcement actions against individual wrongdoers, is
the welfare enhancing.

*

© 2012 Urska Velikonja, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis
King Carey School of Law. J.D. Harvard; LL.M. Harvard; LL.B. University of Ljubljana.
The Article was selected in a competitive call for papers for presentation at the C-LEAF
Junior Business and Financial Law Workshop at George Washington University, where it
was also awarded a Junior Faculty Scholarship Prize. I would like to thank Jennifer Arlen,
Peter Conti-Brown, Cynthia Glassman, Michelle Harner, Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Christine Hurt, Ira Lindsay, Robert Rhee, Ganesh Sitaraman, Max Stearns, Joseph Yockey,
and participants of the faculty workshop at Villanova University School of Law and the
Junior Faculty Workshop at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
for their thoughtful comments. Any misleading, incorrect, or incomplete disclosures remain
the responsibility of the author, to the extent they are material.

2

The Social Cost of Financial Misrepresentations

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 2
I. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ................................................................. 9
II. THE BIGGER PICTURE .............................................................................. 15
A. Financial Misrepresentations and Market Distortion .................... 15
B. Empirical Evidence on the Cost of Financial Misrepresentations . 20
1. Intra-firm Cost .......................................................................................... 21

a.
b.

Cost to Shareholders in the Fraud Firm ................................ 21
Cost to Non-Shareholders ..................................................... 22

2. External Costs ........................................................................................... 24

a.
Equity Market Effects ........................................................... 24
b.
Debt Market Cost .................................................................. 27
c.
Labor Market Cost ................................................................ 29
d.
Cost to Product Markets ........................................................ 32
e.
Other Costs ............................................................................ 34
C. Determinants of the Social Cost’s Magnitude .................................... 34
1. Likelihood of Fraud .................................................................................. 35
2. Size of the Distortion from Fraud ............................................................. 36

a.
b.
c.

Fraud Characteristics ............................................................. 37
Fraud Firm Characteristics .................................................... 38
Market Characteristics .......................................................... 38
III. MISSING THE BIGGER PICTURE .............................................................. 40
A. History ............................................................................................. 40
B. The Changed Nature of Securities Fraud ....................................... 41
C. Blinders of the Discipline ................................................................ 43
IV. IMPLICATIONS ........................................................................................ 44
A. Implications for Fraud Prevention, Regulation, and Enforcement 45
A. Implications for Competing Theories of the Firm .......................... 54
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 55
INTRODUCTION
Financial manipulation at WorldCom destroyed tens of billions of
dollars in investors’ equity and pushed the firm into bankruptcy.1 When it
emerged two years later as MCI, Inc., it had shed 33,000 employees, more

1

Before fraud was unmasked, WorldCom was one of the largest telecommunications
companies with $160 billion in assets. In a class action settlement, WorldCom’s
shareholders ultimately recovered $6.1 billion. Ken Belson, WorldCom’s Audacious
Failure and Its Toll on an Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at C1.
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than a third of its workforce.2 Its general unsecured creditors ultimately
received only 36 cents on the dollar.3 While WorldCom was fabricating its
financials, its rivals, Sprint and AT&T, made business decisions on the
supposition that WorldCom’s success was real. Under pressure from its own
shareholders, AT&T cut $7.5 billion in costs and laid off 20,000 employees.
Still unable to compete with WorldCom’s figures, AT&T split itself into
three units, which were sold individually—a decision then, and now, widely
viewed as value destroying. In fact, during all that time, WorldCom’s true
costs were higher than AT&T’s.4 Telecommunication equipment
manufacturers, including Lucent Technologies and Nortel Networks,
initially benefitted from WorldCom’s apparent success, but suffered when
the industry retrenched after the fraud was revealed. Both suppliers fired
workers and saw their equity shrink.5 In the aftermath of the WorldCom
fraud, the telecommunications industry as a whole lost 300,000 jobs (out of
1.3 million).6 WorldCom’s share price, the usual yardstick for measuring
harm from securities fraud, captured none of these harms.
WorldCom may have been an unfortunate outlier, but it is hardly
unique. During the fraud, managers sell the lie by hiring and investing more
and cutting prices. Goosed hiring, excessive investment and prices too low
distort every market they touch. Creditors underprice credit, employees
make career and retirement decisions based on a false picture of their
employer’s prospects, and rivals make business decisions on a distorted
playing field.7 After disclosing accounting improprieties, many firms file
for bankruptcy, fire workers, repudiate debts, and close operations, harming
their suppliers and customers.

2

See Steve Alexander, Former Holders of MCI Stock Miss Out: The Bidding War for
MCI Will Enrich the Firm's Shareholders - the Current Ones, STAR TRIBUNE, May 1, 2005,
at D1.
3
See Official Comm’t of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 84–
85 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that general unsecured creditors recovered 36 cents on the
dollar and limiting the distribution of the SEC Fair Fund proceeds to those investors who
have recovered less)
4
Rebecca Blumenstein & Peter Grant, On the Hook: Former Chief Tries to Redeem
Calls He Made at AT&T, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2004, at A1. See also Sadka, supra note 81,
at 459–60 (showing that AT&T and Sprint performed much better than WorldCom
between 1999 and 2002, the period of fraud).
5
Edward J. Romar & Martin Calkins, WorldCom Case Study Update,
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/dialogue/candc/cases/worldcom-update.html/.
6
Alexander, supra note 2, at D1.
7
See Cynthia A. Glassman, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Financial Reform:
Relevance and Reality in Financial Reporting, Sept. 16, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch091603cag.htm.
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Without doubt, financial misrepresentations8 harm more than just
investors. But one would not know that from looking at the nature of our
securities laws, from statutes to rulemaking,9 from enforcement decisions to
judicial opinions,10 from policy debates11 to academic analysis.12 This
Article argues that the fundamental assumption of securities regulation and
enforcement is wrong. A growing body of accounting literature shows that
financial misrepresentations affect business decisions by firms and their
rivals, and thereby distort markets for both inputs and outputs. The ripple
effects of the distortion are felt throughout the economy and, once
aggregated, exceed the harms to defrauded shareholders by a substantial
margin.13
WorldCom, Enron, and their unfortunate sisters–in–crime roused
regulators from their slumber, and financial misrepresentations received
more attention. Enforcement included many highly-publicized criminal
prosecutions against both firms and their managers. After Enron’s audit
firm, Arthur Andersen, was indicted and filed for bankruptcy, and a number
of executives received long prison sentences, critics—the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce,14 the American Bar Association,15 the Business Roundtable,16
8

The Article uses the terms financial misrepresentations, fraud, accounting fraud, and
fraudulent disclosures interchangeably to refer to fraud, not mere inaccuracy in reported
financial statements.
9
The Securities Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to consider the ―public interest‖ in
rulemaking, defining it as ―whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.‖ 15 U.S.C. §78c(f).
10
See e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975).
11
See COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAP. MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2007), at 12, available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/
files/reports/0703capmarkets_full.pdf/ (concluding that the purposes of securities
regulation are investor protection and fostering capital formation).
12
The most commonly used securities regulation textbook begins its first chapter:
―The securities laws exist because of the unique informational needs of investors.‖ JAMES
D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (6th ed. 2009).
13
See Art Durnev & Claudine Mangen, Corporate Investments: Learning from
Restatements, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 679, 699 (2009) (finding that costs to rivals exceed those to
investors in restating firms by a factor of four); Eitan Goldman, Irina Stefanescu & Urs
Peyer, Financial Misrepresentation and Its Impact on Rivals, 27 & fig. 3, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=774364/ (suggesting that the aggregate stock price decline by rivals exceeds the
loss to fraud firms by nearly an order of magnitude).
14
See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 2 (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/0603secenforcementstudy.pdf/
(suggesting that the SEC had adopted an ―overly punitive approach to enforcement‖).
15
See ABA ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TASK FORCE, REPORT TO ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES ON EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 17 (2006) (arguing that civil and criminal enforcement
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various congressmen,17 mayors,18 and academics19—expressed concern that
the pendulum had swung too far. The most articulate of these contended
that the costs of securities regulation and enforcement exceeded the
purported benefits.20 They worried that ―corporate leaders were focusing
inordinate time on compliance minutiae rather than on innovative strategies
for growth,‖21 and that U.S. capital markets were suffering under the weight
of costly regulation.22
The same sentiment appears to have reduced the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (―SEC‖) and Department of Justice’s (―DOJ‖)23
appetite for vigorous enforcement of the accounting improprieties
discovered during the 2008–09 financial crisis.24 The court-appointed
actions against fraud harmed firms, eroded individuals’ constitutional rights, and
undermined the role of lawyers).
16
See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigation Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2054/ (statement of Karen J. Mathis,
President, American Bar Association) (listing the Business Roundtable among the
organizations critical of corporate prosecutions).
17
See e.g., Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn
from London, at A18, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006.
18
Id.
19
See e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1063 (2008)
(arguing that firms generally overpay for fraud); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1534, 1534 (2006) [hereinafter Coffee, Reforming] (naming the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce as a powerful advocate for this position); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) (arguing that imposing structural changes on
corporations investigated for criminal fraud may be inefficiently costly); Donald C.
Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639,
646-47 (1996) (proposing damage caps in securities fraud class actions to reduce the
amount of overpayment); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (condemning the act as overly
costly) [hereinafter Romano, Quack Corporate Governance]
20
See id. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71,
81–82 (2006).
21
Schumer & Bloomberg, supra note 17, at A18.
22
COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAP. MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 11.
23
The DOJ, which was very active after the accounting scandals of 2001–02, has been
uninterested in prosecuting financial misrepresentations uncovered during the recent
financial crisis. Instead, it has directed its resources toward prosecuting mortgage
originators for fraud, more than doubling the number of cases brought and defendants
charged from 2009 to 2010. FINANCIAL FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, FIRST YEAR
REPORT 2010, at 3.5, 3.7–3.8, available at http://www.stopfraud.gov/docs/ FFETF-ReportLR.pdf/.
24
The SEC has investigated and sanctioned a handful of firms for accounting fraud
during the 2008 financial crisis, but overall its efforts have been modest. See Securities &
Exchange Comm’n, SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct That Led to or
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examiner found serious accounting violations at Lehman Brothers,
including understated liabilities of more than $50 billion25 (compare this
with WorldCom, which hid $12 billion in losses).26 Yet, the SEC has not
yet initiated an enforcement action against the firm or any individual
involved. The SEC defended its reticence by explaining that it was not
convinced ―that Lehman shareholders suffered material harm‖ from the
misstatement, without considering whether non-shareholders may have
been harmed.27
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and enforcement following the accounting scandals
of 2001–02 prompted many to study the purported cost of compliance, and
to argue that it is excessive.28 But the benefit of reducing fraudulent
disclosures has received considerably less attention.29 This is largely
Arose From the Financial Crisis, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012) (reporting a $75 million settlement with Citigroup and a $22.5
million settlement with the CEO of Countrywide, Angelo Mozillo, for accounting
manipulations). Overall, the SEC has charged 49 senior corporate officials and sanctioned
25 for fraud arising from the financial crisis of 2008. Compare that with the efforts of
DOJ’s Corporate Fraud Task Force after the fraud scandals of 2001–02 that, within seven
years, secured over 1,300 convictions, including of ―more than 200 chief executive officers
and presidents, more than 120 corporate vice presidents, and more than 50 chief financial
officers.‖ Dep’t of Justice, President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force Adds Six New Member
Agencies, Jan. 6, 2009, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/ 09-odag003.html/.
25
See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.,
08-13555 (Mar. 11, 2010), at 739 (―Lehman temporarily reduced its net balance sheet at
quarter-end through its Repo 105 practice by approximately $38.6 billion in fourth quarter
2007, $49.1 billion in first quarter 2008, and $50.38 billion in second quarter 2008.‖).
26
Joseph Bower & Stuart Gilson, The Social Cost of Fraud and Bankruptcy, HARV.
BUS. REV., Dec. 2003, at 20, 20.
27
Jean Eaglesham & Liz Rappaport, Lehman Probe Stalls; Chance of No Charges,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2011, at B1 (emphasis added).
28
See e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting
in Leisure, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 69 (2006) (criticizing the law because it
increased the costs of corporate compliance); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to
Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 280-81 (2004); Romano, Quack Corporate
Governance, supra note 20 (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was unnecessary); Ivy
Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 961964/ (arguing that SOX cost U.S.
equity markets $1.4 trillion).
29
See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on
the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 117 (2011) [hereinafter Bratton & Wachter, FOTM]
(―Scholars have written about the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley’s new regime, but we are aware
of no significant scholarship on the benefits of increased compliance.‖) (citation omitted);
John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP.
91, 91-92 (2007) (evaluating the costs as well as the benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989)
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because the underlying questions about the size and the incidence of the
cost of securities fraud are considered to be all but resolved. The consensus
view is that the social cost from any single incident of fraud is negligible (or
on net small) and borne almost entirely by defrauded shareholders, who also
bear the brunt of any sanctions imposed on firms after truth is revealed.30
But, this Article shows that financial misrepresentations harm nonshareholders, both while the fraud is ongoing and thereafter. Compliance
imposes costs on honest and dishonest firms alike. But fraud, likewise,
harms honest and dishonest firms. With all costs known and accounted for,
the following conclusions are inescapable: (1) financial misrepresentations
affect financial markets as well as markets for inputs, labor and credit, and
product markets; (2) framing accounting fraud as solely securities fraud
understates the social harms caused by it; and (3) regulation and
enforcement predicated on the assumption that accounting fraud does not
impose negative externalities on non-shareholders will underdeter.31 If the
estimates of the social cost of financial misrepresentations and their
incidence are correct, then much of the received wisdom about securities
fraud deterrence, the incentives of investors to prevent fraud, the costeffectiveness of existing regulation, the balance between public and private
enforcement, the ―vexatiousness‖ of securities fraud class actions,32 and the
need to reign in ―overreaching prosecutors‖ must be re-evaluated.33
In Part I, the Article recounts the conventional wisdom on securities
fraud deterrence. In Part II, the Article explains analytically how financial
misrepresentations distort non-financial markets. It then marches through
empirical evidence market-by-market, and suggests that the costs of
financial misstatements have been grossly understated in the existing
literature. Finally, it suggests that the size of the distortion depends largely
on the duration of fraud, firm size, and competition in product markets. In
addition to making fraud more likely, imperfect competition also enables
(explaining that sanctions are costly, but may be efficient if they reduce the number and/or
cost of violations).
30
See e.g., COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 12, AT 727–29 (citing more
than a dozen scholarly articles expressing the consensus view).
31
Even if the cost calculus is adjusted, enforcement strategies might still underdeter
when the sanction is placed on the firm if the firm cannot effectively shift it to deter the
individuals who commit fraud. See e.g., Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and
Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281 (2011).
32
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
33
United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1330 n.9 (7th Cir. 1988) (―A pre-indictment
hearing would help prevent overreaching by prosecutors . . . in the drafting of ambiguous
plea agreements.‖); Baer, supra note 20, at 1062; Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle
And Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure On Corporate
Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 55 (2007).
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managers to shield profits and protect the stock price by shifting the costs of
fraud onto customers, employees, suppliers. In Part III, the Article provides
possible explanations for the blindness of commentators to the full social
cost of financial misrepresentations, including history, innovation in
wrongdoing, and intellectual path dependence. Finally, in Part IV, the
Article describes the implications of this research. Specifically, the Article
argues that shareholders do not have optimal incentives to prevent financial
misrepresentations. Because the social cost of misrepresentations is
dispersed and difficult to measure in each case, our best bet to reduce fraud
to the socially optimal level might be substantial sanctions against
individual wrongdoers coupled with ex ante regulation designed to improve
the quality of disclosures.
The Article focuses on financial misrepresentations because, at least
over the last decade, they are the most common species in the menagerie of
securities fraud.34 Hence, virtually all relevant empirical work has studied
the effect of financial misrepresentations. But, other inaccurate disclosures
on which market participants rely can distort decision-making,35 producing
ripple effects that ought to be taken into account when making policy and
enforcement decisions, and designing regulation.
In addition, the Article focuses on misrepresentations, but relies in large
part on studies that report effects of (mere) restatements, not just
restatements accompanied by an enforcement action. Where studies report
both, the effect of the latter is greater.36 This warrants two observations.
First, social welfare losses accompany even entirely innocent
misstatements.37 Second, measuring the effects of fraud by looking at all
restating firms understates social welfare losses from fraud from each
34

See Securities Class Action Filings 2011: A Year in Review 28, fig. 26,
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_
research/2011_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2011_YIR.pdf/ (reporting that 94% of
class actions filed in 2011 alleged misrepresentations in financial documents, a percentage
that has remained stable over the years).
35
See e.g., SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing, 452 F.Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Wis. 1978)
(holding that misleading disclosures pertaining to managerial integrity were material); In
the Matter of Franchard Corporation, 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964) (concluding that operating
misstatements are material); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 519–20 (observing that managers’ character and firm culture increase
the propensity for fraud)
36
Durnev and Mangen report that aggregate stock-market losses to rivals are 4-times
the size of losses suffered by the restating firm, while Goldman, Peyer, and Stefanescu find
losses to rivals almost 10-times the size of losses to the fraud firm. See supra note 13.
37
Some of the studies reported in Part II measure effects of mere restatements, others
of restatements accompanied by enforcement actions. Although the effects of mere
restatements are smaller, they are not negligible. See id.
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incident (assuming at least some restatements are innocent).38 Nevertheless,
the normative arguments in this Article focus on fraudulent financial
disclosures. But, in terms of harm caused by false disclosures, however, the
relationship between fraud and a restatement is not one of black and white,
but rather one of various shades of gray.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
According to the received wisdom, the purpose of regulation of, and
liability for, fraudulent disclosures is deterrence.39 In order to deter
optimally (not too much and not too little), the malefactor must ―be
confronted with the cost of his violation,‖40 increased by the probability of
avoiding detection and sanctioning. Otherwise, he will commit more fraud
than is optimal, just like a chemical plant will produce too much pollution
unless it is required to pay for the harm caused.41 Cost internalization can
rarely be achieved without enforcement, which is by itself costly. No matter
how large the social cost of fraud, the marginal cost of enforcement at some
point exceeds the marginal benefit of fraud prevention.42 Therefore, the
optimal level of fraud is not zero.
For optimal deterrence, regulatory and enforcement activity should
strive to minimize the net social cost associated with fraud. To justify an
extra dollar spent on enforcement, regulation and regulatory compliance

38

Not all restatements suggest fraud, not all accounting frauds are followed by a
restatement or an enforcement action. Using restatements alone overstates, but using
enforcement actions understates fraud. Karpoff and his collaborators report that public
enforcement actions accompany 40.2% of all restatements in their sample; they also note
that many firms subject to an enforcement action do not survive long enough to file a
restatement, and some simply ignore SEC’s instruction to file a restatement. Jonathan M.
Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 585 & n.9 (2008).
39
See e.g., Coffee, Reforming, supra note 20, at 1547 (describing deterrence as a
primary rationale in favor securities litigation, though the author subsequently expresses
doubt about its effectiveness); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities
Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2178 (2010) [hereinafter
Rose, Multienforcer Approach].
40
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 349-50 (1972). It is
irrelevant from the social welfare standpoint whether the violator pays the cost to the
victims or into state coffers. Id.
41
There is a strong argument in favor of penalizing intentional wrongs beyond the cost
that they cause, to reinforce the social norm that wrongdoing is bad.
42
Thomas S. Ulen, The Economics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 17 MANAG. &
DEC. ECON. 351, 357-58 (1996).
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must save at least one dollar in fraud.43 The main advantage of the socialcost approach is that it focuses the analysis on why prevent wrongs in the
first place: not only because they alter the distribution of wealth, but
because that wealth transfer reduces social welfare as individuals change
how they behave. The social cost of theft is not the value of the stolen
necklace, but the cost of precautions taken to prevent burglaries, including
buying heavier locks, handguns, or safe deposit boxes, and the opportunity
cost of the reduced willingness to buy expensive jewelry in the first place.44
Before we can decide how much to deter a particular activity, we must
decide how much of that activity we want, which requires determining the
net social cost of the activity. Financial misrepresentations are generally
understood as a species of fraud. In a plain vanilla case of fraud, a con artist
defrauds a mark without any effect on a third party. Consider the
apocryphal Brooklyn Bridge scam: a conman convinces a naïve immigrant
that he owns the bridge with forged documents, and sells it for a princely
sum of money.45 The con clearly has distributive effects—the involuntary
transfer of value from the gullible victim to the conman—and also produces
a social cost associated with enforcement. In a civil suit for compensatory
damages, if she ever files it, the victim will only recover her private
monetary cost from the particular incident, but not the net social cost of the
fraud (let alone the net social cost multiplied by the probability of
detection). As a result, punitive damages or criminal sanctions may be
necessary to adequately deter such fraud.46
Financial misrepresentations in the secondary market for securities are
often conceptualized as plain vanilla fraud, and the law has responded by
providing defrauded shareholders a private right of action, in addition to

43

See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 575-81
(2004) (discussing the determinants of the ―optimal structure of legal intervention‖);
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 916 (1998) (―Regulations impose a
cost on issuers. . . . [F]or particular investors and issuers an optimal level of securities
regulation exists.‖); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in
Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 626-27 (1992).
44
See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 207 (1968) (observing that the largest element of the social cost of crime is spent on
precaution). Moreover, the thief values the necklace less than its owner (otherwise the thief
would have gone to the store and bought it), so even the net transfer alone is not a wash.
45
At least some believe the story is real. Gabriel Cohen, For You, Half Price, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 27, 2005, at 4.
46
See e.g., Ulen, supra note 42, at 360 (arguing that social costs of fraud justify
imposing punitive sanctions).
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public enforcement.47 In a suit for damages, the defrauded shareholders
allege that they bought stock based on managers’ false statements. The
prices paid were artificially inflated by material lies and omissions and so
the defendants—the managers and the vicariously liable firm—ought to pay
damages (and/or be appropriately sanctioned) for the harm the shareholders
suffered.
But there are two important differences between plain vanilla fraud and
financial misrepresentations in the secondary market that explain the
opposition to fraud regulation and enforcement. First, investors can and do
trade in stock in small increments. All investors have the ability to diversify
their holdings and to trade frequently. Ex ante, they are as likely to be
sellers as to be buyers, so, on average, their expected cost of fraud over time
approximates zero, particularly in the absence of insider trading.48
Second, while a few insider defendants sell at prices inflated by fraud,
most sellers are uninvolved and are allowed to keep the gain.49 Since
defendants’ gain is smaller than plaintiffs’ losses, the shortfall must be
made up, usually from shareholders who held on to their stock during
fraud.50
If there is insider trading—and crooked managers often reduce their
stockholdings while cooking the books51—fraud will injure even diversified
47

Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (finding
an implied private right of action to sue for damages). Kardon’s holding was later adopted
by ―an overwhelming consensus of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals,‖ Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 79 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted), and the U.S. Supreme Court in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). See also Anjan V. Thakor, Jeffrey S.
Nielsen & David A. Gulley, The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action Litigation, at
4 (observing that the securities fraud class action is based on the same principles and
presumptions as a common law action for fraud).
48
To quote Judge Posner, ―Often the net measurable damages from a stock fraud will
be zero.‖ Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 159, 169 (1986). See also COX ET AL., supra note 12, at 728; Janet Cooper
Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1502
(1996) (arguing that diversification and frequent trading effectively protects investors
against securities fraud); Richard A. Booth, The End Of The Securities Fraud Class Action
As We Know It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2007) (contending that investors can fully
protect themselves from securities fraud losses by diversifying their holdings).
49
Thakor et al., supra note 47, at 4.
50
Coffee suggests that buy-and-hold investors are the ones most likely to pay the
damages from securities litigation; the beneficiaries are frequent traders, such as hedge
funds. Coffee, Reforming, supra note 20, at 1560.
51
See e.g., Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent
Accounting, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2169, 2170 & Fig.1 (2009) (noting that Enron insiders sold
millions of dollars worth of Enron stock while fraud was ongoing, but billions in fact
changed hands during that time).
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investors because insider trading transfers value from investors to insiders.
But that transfer is much smaller than the aggregate decline in the price of
affected stock, because insiders’ sales represent only a small fraction of
aggregate transactions in the stock.52 More importantly, a prudent investor
diversifies anyway, so there is no incremental cost to diversify the risk of
fraud. A number of commentators and courts have accepted that the
measure of ill-gotten gains from insider trading is the net social cost of
fraud.53
Others have acknowledged that social cost of fraud might be larger and
include other cost categories. In his avowedly exhaustive list of the costs of
securities fraud, Richard Posner notes that fraud produces three types of
costs: what managers spend to conceal fraud, what investors spend to find
fraud, and increased stock-market volatility—all costs that befall
investors.54
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, likewise, contend that accounting
fraud causes harms other than the net transfer from investors to insiders, but
those harms, too, are largely borne by investors: the ―total cost of carrying
out the offense, unmasking the offense, taking precautions against similar
offenses, and litigating about offenses.‖55 They acknowledge that securities
fraud might reduce the allocative efficiency of the economy, because it
diverts resources from non-fraud firms to those that engage in fraud, and
distorts the choice between investment and consumption.56 But, they
conclude, without empirical support, that the social cost will be ―small, and
for many offenses the transfer of wealth [from shareholders to insiders] will
be far and away the largest element of the net harm.‖57
Jennifer Arlen and Bill Carney observe that managers commit fraud
when they fear for their jobs. Thus, fraud is an agency cost to the
shareholders: they spend resources to monitor managers and to detect fraud,
52

Richard A. Booth, What Is a Business Crime?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 142-43
(2008) (arguing that absent insider trading, investor losses equal investor gains); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
611, 622 (1985).
53
Alexander, supra note 48, at 1498 (―Aggregate class trading losses are probably
greater than either the true net social cost of the violation or the benefits received by the
violator, both of which are speculative in nature and difficult to calculate.‖); Adam C.
Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of
Securities Class Actions, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 219 (arguing that disgorgement
of unlawful gains is the right measure of damages for securities fraud because it
approximates the social costs of fraud) [hereinafter Pritchard, Stoneridge].
54
Posner, supra note 48, at 170.
55
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 623.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 625.
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reduce their willingness to invest in the stock market for risk of fraud, and
bear the cost of fraud enforcement.58
More recently, Paul Mahoney has acknowledged that securities fraud
also sends inaccurate price signals that may induce inefficient transfers in
both financial and real markets, including commodity, product, and labor
markets.59 He ultimately dismisses the concern about the effects on the real
economy and concludes that temporary mispricing of a security leads to
small allocative costs, because it is irrelevant for the efficiency of capital
markets who owns individual stocks.60
Finally, Marcel Kahan, in an attempt to provide a comprehensive
overview of the social cost of inaccurate stock prices, focuses almost
entirely on the social cost to financial markets, including reduced liquidity,
increased risk, higher cost of capital, and impaired corporate governance.61
Kahan acknowledges that a rapid stock price decline can cause a
macroeconomic shock, as consumers feel less wealthy and thus consume
less, which lowers the rate of economic growth.62 Thus, if fraud causes a
rapid stock-market decline, it might affect non-financial markets, but that
effect will be indirect (rather than direct, as this Article suggests) and
infrequent.
Despite a generation of increasing, and increasingly audacious, financial
manipulation, followed by a substantial stock-market decline, a recession
and a jobless recovery,63 scholarship has continued to focus solely on the
effects of fraud (and fraud-prevention efforts) on financial markets.64 Even
58

Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 740 & n.71 (1992).
59
Mahoney, supra note 43, at 631.
60
Id. at 633-34.
61
See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1042 (1992) (―In this Article, I have put forward a
comprehensive framework for analyzing the benefits of a wide range of securities laws
directed toward enhancing stock price accuracy.‖). Kahan omits financial manipulation as a
possible cause for inaccurate stock prices (but lists non-disclosure, misassessment,
speculative trading and liquidity crunches). Id. at 988–94.
62
Id. at 1034-35. For the wealth effect, many consumers must also be investors.
Alternately, non-investors anticipate the wealth effect to investors, precipitating a
recession.
63
Earnings manipulations created a ―generally adverse attitude of capital markets
towards companies and their executives,‖ leading to poor ―growth of business investment
and the consequent product loss over the last two to three years.‖ Baruch Lev, Corporate
Earnings: Facts and Fiction, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 43 (2003).
64
For representative recent papers studying the effect of accounting fraud on financial
markets, see e.g., Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon & Edward Maydew, How Much Will
Firms Pay for Earnings That Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly
Fraudulent Earnings, 79 ACCT. REV. 387 (2004); Edward J. Kane, Continuing Dangers of
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proponents of more spirited enforcement, who recognize that
―[m]isstatements create several types of harms,‖ include only costs borne by
investors among them: higher verification costs, raised liquidity costs for
liquidity traders, and higher agency costs for all corporations.65
As a result of their myopic focus on investors’ losses, commentators
have criticized increased regulatory intensity and more vigorous
enforcement, including criminal prosecutions and private litigation.66
Usually, the critics assert that securities fraud is ―overlitigated,‖67 that
sanctions ―overcompensate‖68 investors and ―overdeter,‖69 and that firms
―overpay‖70 for their employees’ misdeeds.
Cost-benefit analyses of corporate governance are inherently difficult
because we lack reliable information on the cost and the prevalence of
wrongdoing, on the cost of prevention and enforcement, and on the wrongs
prevented by regulation. But, if the social cost of financial
misrepresentations is greater than is currently assumed, then compliance
and enforcement predicated on the assumption of lower cost will produce
less accurate disclosures than is socially optimal.71

Disinformation in Corporate Accounting Fraud, 13 REV. FIN. ECON. 149 (2004); Karpoff
et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (discussing losses to firms reporting
accounting fraud as measured by stock price decline of the firm); Joshua Ronen, Post
Enron Reform: Financial Statements Insurance, and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J. L. & BUS.
39 (2002).
65
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 719 (2006). See also Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra
note 39, at 2179-80 (cataloguing the social costs of fraud in the post-Enron world and
including investors’ verification costs, liquidity costs, and impaired ability to monitor
corporate managers).
66
See sources cited supra note 28.
67
See e.g., Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical
Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. _ (2011) (forthcoming) (observing that corporate fraud
often leads to the filing of parallel lawsuits, which target the same underlying misconduct);
Mahoney, supra note 43, at 623–24 (arguing that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine
overdeters voluntary disclosure by firms).
68
Thakor et al., supra note 47, at 1.
69
Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1301, 1303-04 (2008) [hereinafter Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation].
70
Baer, supra note 20, at 1063; Lisa K. Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New
Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 NYU L. REV. 311 (2007).
71
See e.g., Lynn Bai, James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Lying and Getting Caught:
An Empirical Study on the Effect of Securities Class Action Settlements on Targeted Firms,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1883 (2010) (studying the costs of securities class actions);
Erickson, supra note 67, at 55 (analyzing the costs of corporate fraud litigation).
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II. THE BIGGER PICTURE
This Part details the many ways in which financial misrepresentations
distort decisions by firms and the providers of capital and labor. It then
summarizes empirical evidence on the cost of false disclosures, both
internal to the fraud-firm and external. Cost to non-shareholders may be less
visible (at least immediately) and thus harder to quantify than stock price
declines, but is no less real. More importantly, non-shareholders are
generally less able than investors to insure against or diversify against their
risk. The Part concludes with an analysis of the factors that affect the size of
the distortion caused by fraud. Not surprisingly, the size of the fraudcommitting firm, both absolute and relative to its industry peers, and the
duration of the misrepresentation both increase the harms from fraud. More
surprisingly, product market competition affects both the size of the
distortion and the distribution of the cost from fraud: the less competitive
the product market, the more the affected firms are able to shift the cost
away from its investors.
A. Financial Misrepresentations and Market Distortion
Stock manipulation through stock pools was the motivating factor
driving the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Manipulative
stock pools consisted of agreements among a group of traders to delegate
authority to a single manager to trade in a specific stock for a set period of
time and share the profits.72 Pool managers bought large quantities of the
stock to boost its price, hoping to spark the interest of other buyers, and
then sell the stock to them at a profit.73 Although there is much
disagreement about how much harm stock pools in fact caused,74 they were
perceived to be ―the chief evil for which a remedy [was] demanded.‖75
Manipulative stock pools produce two types of false information: a high
stock price and inflated trading activity. This distorts investors’ behavior,

72

Guolin Jiang, Paul G. Mahoney & Jianping Mei, Market Manipulation: A
Comprehensive Study of Stock Pools, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 148–49 (2005).
73
Id. Similar stock manipulation techniques have remained popular to this day. SEC
Charges Boiler Room Operators in Florida-Based Penny Stock Manipulation Scheme, Jan.
26, 2012, available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-18.htm/.
74
See e.g., Jiang et al., supra note 72, at 147 (finding that stock pools were used for
manipulation, but led to only moderate short-run price increases).
75
Report to Secretary of Commerce of Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation 13,
reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 16 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 1973).
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but does not directly influence decisions by other market participants.76
Moreover, the wrongdoer manipulates stock prices intending to defraud
investors.
Financial misrepresentations, on the other hand, are accompanied by
inflated stock prices, but the stock price is only a symptom of the false
disclosure. Market participants, including the firm’s employees and lenders,
its suppliers and rivals rely on specific false disclosures about the firm’s
business operations, which impairs their ability to make accurate decisions.
In addition, managers’ motivations for misrepresenting their earnings are
more complex than the motivations of stock manipulators: they want to
mislead their shareholders, but also the analysts, their rivals, their
employees and lenders. Thus, one would expect that financial
misrepresentations distort the allocation of economic resources and—
because such distortion affects all firms, not just fraudulent ones—the
effects of such distortion are significant.
Equity bubbles, like the tech bubble in the late 1990s, also pull
resources from other sectors, move savings into equities, and affect the cost
of borrowing.77 Like fraud, bubbles might be followed by business failures
and layoffs. But they do not distort decisions within an industry and thus do
not distort product markets directly.
The most common reason for fraudulent disclosures appears to be
subpar performance.78 Managers fear dismissal if they report disappointing
earnings. In response, they overstate earnings, hoping to make up the
76

Moreover, stock prices alone convey relatively little information compared with
financial disclosures. And so, one would expect that they produce a smaller distortion to
markets other than equity.
77
The internet and telecommunication booms are recent examples. An older example
includes railroads: extensive miles of track were laid (including spurs to future towns not
yet built) by firms in the railroad industry only to be followed by numerous bankruptcies in
the late 1870s. See Illinois Railroad Boom, 1865-73, http://www.eslarp.uiuc.edu/ibex/
archive/vignettes/rrboom.htm. The Chicago Sun Times wrote in 1872 that wealth from the
railroads ―will so overflow our coffers with gold that our paupers will be millionaires . . .‖
Id.
78
Arlen & Carney, supra note 58, at 701. Even in the largest frauds, managers rarely
set out to commit the fraud that ultimately results. As Don Langevoort and others have
suggested, managers usually begin by manipulating ―just a little,‖ perhaps to cover a
temporary blip in performance, and hope that they can smooth over the manipulation in the
next period. When the next period fails to bring good news, the slippery slope leads
managers to ever greater manipulation. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate
Thermostat, Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving
others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 308 (2004); Michael
Guttentag, Stumbling Into Crime: Stochastic Process Models of Accounting Fraud, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW (A. Harel & K. Hylton, eds.
2011).

The Social Cost of Financial Misrepresentations

17

shortfall in the next period and disguise the fraud.79 Other managers might
misreport their firm’s performance because of greed: the structure of
managerial compensation provides supercharged incentives for fraud. They
overstate the firm’s financials to inflate the stock price, exercise their stock
options, and pocket millions of dollars.80
Whatever the reason for the misrepresentation, all frauds are alike: the
firm releases a misleading financial statement, often accompanied by
similarly misleading public pronouncements. In addition to making a false
disclosure, fraud firms change their real actions to conform to their reported
financial health.81 Managers might sell output at a loss, announce new
projects, overinvest in fixed assets, and overhire. Indeed, there is evidence
that managers frequently go to great lengths to conceal fraud. They lie to
their accountants,82 threaten dismissal to those who resist,83 reduce their
prices to convey to competitors the appearance of superior performance,84
and even pay taxes on nonexistent earnings.85
Although financial statements are prepared for shareholders, a much
broader array of actors uses them and adjusts their actions based on their
reliance. Employees make career and retirement decisions based on
perceived prospects of their employer, lenders price credit based on
79

See id. at 702-03 (identifying the ―last period‖ problem as an important cause of
accounting fraud).
80
See Adam C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions
With Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 932-34 (1999)
(arguing that greed can induce managers to commit accounting fraud).
81
See Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product
Markets: Theory and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom), 8
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439, 447 (2006) (observing that managers will change their business
decisions to conceal fraud, but only if fraud itself is punished).
82
See e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM:
THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 128, 157-58 (2003) (describing
examples of deals where Enron executives misrepresented facts to its accountants, Arthur
Andersen).
83
Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper, accountants at Enron and WorldCom
respectively, brought accounting problems to the attention of management. Both were
threatened with termination and Watkins was reassigned. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From
Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U.L.Q.
357, 362-63, 369 (2003). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act later prohibited retaliation against
whistleblowers, and the Dodd-Frank Act further strengthened whistleblower protections by
allowing the SEC to give them a cut of the recovery. See discussion infra in Part IV.
84
See Sadka, supra note 81, at 439, 457-58 (arguing that WorldCom fraud caused
price competition and not vice versa).
85
See Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew, supra note 64, at 389-90 (reporting that out of 27
firms subject to SEC enforcement actions, 15 paid taxes on overstated earnings; the total
amount of taxes paid represented 2.4% of the firms’ market value and 20% of the pretax
value of overstated earnings).
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reported financials, and suppliers set payment terms based on the reported
financial health of their counterparty.86 Assuming that the supply of labor
and capital is not infinite, fraud makes both labor and (debt and equity)
capital relatively more costly for non-fraud firms (than for fraud firms)
while fraud is ongoing, but before it is unmasked.87
Moreover, rivals of fraud firms make business decisions on a distorted
playing field. Learning plays an important role in technology development,
which is critical to growth; firms learn by observing their rivals’ actions.
Other firms’ financial disclosures and annual reports are ―excellent source
document[s]‖ that mitigate uncertainty about industry-level demand and
costs, help firms in the same industry make strategic decisions, and
distinguish good projects from bad ones.88 They are also cheap (certainly
cheaper that industrial espionage), comprehensive, and relatively reliable,
because they are audited and certified, and carry a non-trivial risk of
liability if found to be false.89
86

Firms exist because transaction costs of repeated market transactions exceed the
costs of allocating those same resources within the firm. In intra-firm relationships,
accurate information is essential for owners of the factors of production—labor, capital—
to respond to changed conditions. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
87
Oren Bar-Gill & Lucian A. Bebchuk, Misreporting Corporate Performance 24
(Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion, Paper No. 400, 2002).
88
Durnev & Mangen, supra note 13, at 680-81 (citing from P. Moon & K. Bates, Core
Analysis in Strategic Performance Appraisal, 4 MGMT. ACCT. RES. 139, 140 (1993));
Phillip G. Berger & Rebecca Hann, Segment Disclosures, Proprietary Costs, and the
Market for Corporate Control, at 30 (finding evidence that competitors cannot learn
proprietary information about segment profitability unless it is disclosed); Robert M.
Bushman & Abbie J. Smith, Financial Accounting Information and Corporate
Governance, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 237, 293–94 (2001). Since 1997, the FASB has required
public firms to disclose profit or loss, certain specific revenue and expense items, and
assets by each operating segment in which the firm operates. In addition, firms must report
in which geographic markets they operate and who are their major customers. See FIN.
ACCT. STANDARD BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 131, at
4–5 (1997). Cf. Phillip G. Berger & Rebecca Hann, Segment Profitability and the
Proprietary and Agency Costs of Disclosure, 82 ACCT. REV. 869, 872 (2007) (finding
evidence that, if able to, managers want to hide from their competitors information about
the profitability of a particular segment relative to the industry to deter business entry and
maintain high abnormal profits). Conversely, reporting false profits would (inefficiently)
invite business entry. Id.
89
See Sadka, supra note 81, at 447 (noting that ―enforcement makes financial
statements credible‖); J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom
Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J.
ON REG. 207, 209-10 (2003) (arguing that because WorldCom’s reporting about the growth
of its business was subject to regulatory oversight, ―it was reasonable to rival carriers to
believe WorldCom’s misrepresentation‖).
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Significant misreporting, particularly one of ―core accounts, such as
sales, market share, and cost,‖ 90 impairs rivals’ ability to discern the value
of new business strategies, and other market participants’ ability to
understand the markets in which they operate.91
In other words, firms’ managers do not know ex ante which business
strategy is optimal, and so they look to their rivals as gauges of what the
market wants. If the market appears to reward particular strategies reported
in financial disclosures, rivals will mimic what they perceive to be the best
performer. If that performer is not in fact the best, an entire industry might
adopt a misguided business strategy (and overinvest, overborrow and
overhire) while fraud is ongoing.92
Correcting a false disclosure causes providers of capital and labor to
adjust their risk-assessment of the fraud firm. Business failure is common in
the aftermath, and employees, lenders, and those doing business with the
fraud firm are often harmed. Assuming that fraud is an idiosyncratic event,
rivals should, in theory, benefit, not lose, from its unmasking. A significant
restatement is costly for the firm, and so its rivals could use that opportunity
to grab that firm’s market share. Thus, one would expect that rivals could
attract capital and labor at lower rates than before fraud was unmasked.93
(However, suppliers, distributors, and others doing business with the fraud
firm are expected to incur losses after fraud is unmasked.)
On the other hand, providers of capital (and, to a much lesser extent,
labor) do not know if rivals of the fraud firm are misreporting also, so they
demand higher risk premia or sell their stock in rival firms, which depresses
their stock prices. In accounting literature, the negative effect of discovery
of accounting fraud in one firm on equity prices of rival firms is called
contagion. Studies attribute the contagion effect to two factors: investor

90

Durnev & Mangen, supra note 13, at 681.
Abigail Brown & Simon D. Angus, Destroying Creative Destruction: The Social
Welfare Cost of Fraud, at 4. See generally Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter,
Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2002, at 23 (explaining
evolutionary economics and comparing its with neoclassical assumptions).
92
See Brown & Angus, supra note 91, at 4–5 (describing the process of learning and
economic growth).
93
See Tan Xu, Mohammad Najand & Douglass Ziegenfuss, Intra-Industry Effects of
Earnings Restatements, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 696, 697 (2006) (noting that an ―earnings
restatement could have competitive effect because it could decrease the restating firm’s
competitiveness relative to its competitors‖). See also Larry H.P. Lang & Rene M. Stultz,
Contagion and Competitive Intra-Industry Effects of Bankruptcy Announcements: An
Empirical Study, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 45 (1992) (finding that bankruptcies in concentrated
industries tend to be positively correlated with rivals’ stock prices).
91
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concerns about accounting quality, and higher cost of capital as a result of
concerns about accounting quality (i.e., higher risk).94
In addition to contagion, unmasking of fraud discloses that the prospects
of a particular industry are less rosy than previously believed. In response,
firms in that industry reevaluate their expected return from existing
investment and reduce current investment, reducing their demand for labor
and capital. Lower expected returns are reflected in lower equity prices.
One might contend that firms disclose their financial information to
investors and thus other market participants have no right to rely on them:
their reliance is not justifiable in a legal sense. That may be, but information
is a public good. Once the cat is out of the bag, it is impossible to exclude
market participants from using and relying on disclosed information.
Moreover, it is social welfare enhancing for market participants to rely on
accurate disclosures and make better-informed investment decisions.95
Conversely, their reliance on fraudulent financial disclosures reduces social
welfare.96 Even if the disclosing firm’s stakeholders97 and its rivals have no
legal right to sue for financial misrepresentations, the harms they suffer
ought to be included in the calculation of the total harm that the
misrepresentation causes.
B. Empirical Evidence on the Cost of Financial Misrepresentations
The following sections review the empirical literature estimating the
cost of financial misrepresentations on markets for capital, labor, and
product markets. Distortions impose direct costs, as firms misinvest during
fraud, and indirect costs, as contagion causes investors to flee capital
markets and firms to shrink their businesses. Some of the costs of fraud are
internal to the fraud firm (i.e., bankruptcy), while others are external (i.e.,
94

See Xu et al. supra note 93, at 698 (explaining the causes and mechanics of the
contagion effect).
95
Recent studies suggest that high-quality financial disclosures provide better direction
for all managers’ business decisions. See Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the
Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 207, 209 (2000) (finding evidence that betterinformed stock prices help managers and investors direct resources to growing industries);
Bushman & Smith, supra note 88, at 304–05 (explaining that financial disclosures limit
opportunities for managerial rent-seeking). See also George J. Benston, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 132, 144 (1973) (noting that information that the firm is required to
disclose is valuable to competitors and thus disclosure is costly to the firm and its
investors).
96
Sadka, supra note 81, at 458; Bower & Gilson, supra note 26, at 21.
97
The Article uses the term ―stakeholders‖ to include all non-shareholders with an
interest in the enterprise: employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, distributors, etc.
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product market distortion). The Part first discusses intra-firm costs to
shareholders and non-shareholders. It then broadens the scope to external
costs to markets for equity, debt, labor, and product markets.
1. Intra-firm Cost
a. Cost to Shareholders in the Fraud Firm
Many scholars assume that fraud is zero-sum for a firm’s shareholders.
Sellers win, buyers lose, and those who hold on are unaffected by fraud.98
For this to be true, one must assume that fraudulent disclosures inflate stock
prices, while eventual exposure of fraud returns the price to the correct level
(reflecting fundamentals), which is what the price would have been absent
fraud.99 Subsequent investigation and sanctions impose real cost on firms
and thus their shareholders, but that is an argument for abandoning all
enforcement.100 Because investors can diversify, they are ―effectively
protected against securities fraud.‖101 Thus, enforcement is at best a costly
distraction and at worse a drag on our economy.
While this story could be true for a Basic fraud, where managers
publicly denied (untruthfully) that they were negotiating a merger,102 it is
not true for accounting fraud. Unmasking accounting fraud does more than
just correct the stock price: it discloses accurate earnings, which convey
new information about the firm and the prospects of its industry; it discloses
that capital and labor were misdirected; and it reports that the firm is a den
of thieves.103
98

Alicia J. Davis, Are Investors’ Gains and Losses from Securities Fraud Equal Over
Time? Theory and Evidence, at 31-32, U. Mich L. Sch., Empirical Legal Stud. Ctr.,
Working Paper 09-002 (Revised 10/10) [hereinafter Davis, Investors’ Gains and Losses]
(noting such views and citing authors).
99
See e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 635; Thakor et al., supra note 47,
at 4 (suggesting that investors who held stock in the fraudulent firm during the fraud period
were ―undamaged‖ by the fraud).
100
Karpoff et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 606 (finding that
expected damages and fines represent 8.8% of the stock price decline after discovery of
fraud).
101
Richard A. Booth, Who Should Recover What for Securities Fraud?, at 6.
102
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
103
Cf. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1992) (a Pulitzer prize-winning account
of fraud and insider trading during the leveraged buyout craze of the 1980s). Although
managers can be and usually are replaced after fraud, the culture that created the incentives
and the opportunity for fraud is harder to change. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith,
Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability
Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 519–20 (observing that firm culture—the
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Karpoff, Martin, and Lee demonstrate empirically that financial
misrepresentations are more than a net transfer of wealth from one group of
shareholders to another.104 From a large sample of firms subject to SEC or
DOJ enforcement actions, they find that markets punish fraud firms (and
their shareholders) severely. They find that for every dollar in increased
market value due to fraud, the firm loses that dollar after disclosure of
fraud, and an additional $3.08 ($3.83 for firms that do not file for
bankruptcy). Of that additional loss, only 36 cents (or 8.8%) is due to
expected legal penalties, while $2.71 is lost ―reputation,‖ caused by
expected lower sales and higher cost of contracting and financing.105
A part of the reputational loss represents a transfer of market share from
the fraud firm to its rivals, as customers and employees shift, and is not a
social cost per se.106 But the majority of the reputational losses borne by the
fraud firm represent deadweight economic losses: higher costs of
contracting and financing reflect increased risk.107
As a result, shareholders in the fraud firm who did not trade during the
fraud are not indifferent to accounting fraud. They are worse off than they
would be absent fraud, and often much worse off, even if the firm never
pays damages or fines.108 Even if fraud-tainted sales offset fraud-tainted
purchases ex post, shareholders would prefer that fewer firms commit fraud
ex ante.
b. Cost to Non-Shareholders

system of incentives within the firm—not just managers’ character increases the propensity
for fraud, and that culture is difficult to change).
104
Karpoff et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 581.
105
Id.
106
A shift that produces zero social cost assumes perfect competition, information, and
substitutes, as well as zero transaction costs. When the assumptions are relaxed, as they
must be, all transfers will produce social deadweight losses.
107
See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, at 8, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (Keith Hylton & Alon Harel, eds., forthcoming)
(reporting evidence that markets impose reputational penalties on fraud firms even in the
absence of a criminal investigation). But see Baer, supra note 20, at 1062-63 (contending
that ―[c]orporate indictments also trigger reputation losses, including downturns in the
stock market, a reduction in potential employees and customers, and the exodus of current
customers and employees‖).
108
See Arlen, supra note 107, at 8 (reporting that a firm’s market value declines by
more than the net present value of fines, damages, and other enforcement costs on
announcement of a fraud investigation, but not on announcement of an environmental
violation).
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About a third of firms that have misreported their financials—often
indicated by the fact that the SEC initiated an enforcement action109— file
for bankruptcy.110 Because many firms that cooked their books were
financially stressed beforehand, some number would have filed for
bankruptcy anyway.111 But, many would not have filed. Also, a substantial
percentage of firms were financially healthy before the fraud.112
Accounting fraud in a firm that would have filed for bankruptcy
regardless is not costless. Fraud harms those who extended unsecured
credit, as well as those who bought shares after the fraud began. But, there
are other costs to delaying the inevitable by fraud. Accounting fraud is more
than misstated financials, since managers mask the fraud, both by issuing
misleading public announcements and by changing the firm’s business
decisions to mask the fraud. Stakeholders rely on both and act differently
than if the true (bleak) picture were known. Moreover, fraud often
precipitates a sudden bankruptcy, and the very swiftness is costly by
itself.113 Because fraud obscures accurate signals from the stakeholders,
109

See e.g., COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY
COMMISSION, MARK BEASLEY AT AL., FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1998-2007: AN
ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 1 (2010) (―We analyzed instances of fraudulent
financial reporting alleged by the SEC in AAERs issued during the ten-year period
between January 1998 and December 2007.‖) [hereinafter COSO STUDY]; DELOITTE
FORENSIC CENTER, TEN THINGS ABOUT BANKRUTPCY AND FRAUD: A REVIEW OF
BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 1 (2008) (noting that the authors reviewed AAERs issued during the
study period), available at http://www.bankruptcyfraud.typepad.com/Deloitte Report.pdf/;
Karpoff et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 586-87 (2008)
(―Enforcement actions commonly include a mixture of proceedings that may implicate the
firm itself, other affiliated firms, or individuals associated with the firm. The SEC publicly
discloses these proceedings by filing administrative or litigation releases.‖).
110
See COSO STUDY, supra note 109, at 40 & Tbl. 28 (reporting that 28% of the firms
subject to an AAER between 1998 and 2007 filed for bankruptcy within two years
thereafter); Karpoff et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 593 (reporting
that 34% of firms subject to an SEC or Department of Justice enforcement action between
1978 and 2002 filed for bankruptcy).
111
See COSO STUDY, supra note 109, at 11 (reporting that the median net income of a
fraudulent firm was $875,000, while the 25th percentile firms faced net losses of $2.1
million).
112
See id. (reporting that the 75th percentile firm reported net income of over $18
million, while the highest net income firm in the sample reported almost $8.9 billion). The
study did not disaggregate financial figures for the firms filing for bankruptcy. The Deloitte
Study, however, suggests that many bankrupt firms that committed fraud (measured by an
issuance of an AAER) had very high revenues: 45% of firms reported revenues of more
than $1 billion and 10% reported more than $10 billion. DELOITTE FORENSIC CENTER,
supra note 109, at 9.
113
Financial misrepresentations undermine ―the firm’s credibility with customers,
suppliers, and investors,‖ which is essential for its continued viability. Filing for
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they may face longer periods of dislocation and higher opportunity costs
that they could have avoided if they had known the truth about the firm
(e.g., employees could have looked for new jobs earlier had they seen the
true writing on the wall).
The cost of fraud in an otherwise viable firm is even clearer: in
bankruptcy, shareholders are wiped out, employees lose their jobs, suppliers
and vendors lose their client, and creditors lose at least part of their claim,
not to mention the community disruption resulting from the loss of a major
business.114 Not all fraud-induced bankruptcies result in liquidation. Rather,
the business reorganizes, mitigating the harm of bankruptcy to the
stakeholders (as well as the shareholders, who often receive an equity slice
in the reorganized firm).115 But, bankruptcy itself is a costly process and
usually produces a smaller firm than one that entered it.
Even those fraud firms that avoid bankruptcy often suffer other
significant consequences: they frequently delist (47% compared with 20%
for non-fraud firms over a 10-year period) and are twice as likely as their
honest peers to engage in material asset sales (63% vs. 31%).116 As with
bankruptcy, delisting and material asset sales impose real costs not only on
shareholders, but also on the companies’ stakeholders. Substantial business
shocks like fraud are often accompanied by a retrenchment including a
reduction in sales, investments, and employment.
2. External Costs
Fraud infects equity markets and distorts equity investment. But, fraud
also distorts the allocation of other inputs, including debt and labor, and

bankruptcy might be the only option remaining. Karpoff et al., supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 601.
114
See James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J.
CORP. L. 513, 553-54 (2009) (noting that accounting fraud can lead to insolvency, which
harms not only the shareholders, but also other stakeholders, such as employees and
communities).
115
See UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/
study_results.asp/ (suggesting that most fraud-induced bankruptcies resulted with a
confirmed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization). The presence of a confirmed Chapter 11
plan, however, overstates the number of fraud firms that survived bankruptcy. Enron
emerged with a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, but the sole purpose of the surviving entity,
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., is to liquidate Enron’s assets for the benefit of its
creditors.
See
Enron
Creditors
Recovery
Corp.,
About
ECRC,
http://www.enron.com/index.php?option= com_ content&task=view&id=1&Itemid=9/
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
116
COSO STUDY, supra note 109, at 40.
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product markets. This Part explains the mechanism and estimates the cost of
the distortion.
a. Equity Market Effects
It is commonly believed that any actively-trading individual investor
can eliminate the risk of loss from secondary market fraud by diversifying
her holdings.117 But, while diversification eliminates investors’ exposure to
firm-specific risk of fraud (by spreading the risk over many investments), it
does not eliminate the cost of fraud in the market. If a single fraud produces
a loss of κ, ten frauds usually produce equity losses of more than 10κ. The
cost is greater because ten frauds signal that managers generally cannot be
trusted (i.e., contagion). In the early 2000s, when financial restatements
became nearly everyday occurrences, equity markets suffered severely. 118
The argument that diversified investors are indifferent to accounting
fraud thus assumes that the level of fraud will remain the same over time.119
If, however, the level of accounting fraud increases, the perceived riskiness
of investing in equity will, likewise, increase and—ceteris paribus—reduce
expected returns on equity investments. That systemic risk cannot be
diversified away because it will infect all public firms, affecting both equity
and debt.120
Unlike investors, firms cannot easily reduce the risk of capital
misallocation because of fraud. The supply of capital is not infinite; capital
consumed by the fraud firm could have gone to a worthier firm, which
creates a significant opportunity cost while fraud is ongoing. Enron, for
117

Davis, Investors’ Gains and Losses, supra note 98, at 1–2 (citing several sources
supporting the view, but then finding that they are wrong).
118
As a matter of comparison, when the tech bubble in the spring of 2001, the Dow
Jones Industrial Index (―DJIA‖) declined almost 20 percent from its peak in the winter of
2000. During accounting scandals, between May 2001 and the fall of 2002, the DJIA lost
almost 36 percent.
119
Investors ―are indifferent between investing at a lower price in a firm with an
inefficient institutional arrangement and investing at a higher price in a firm where they are
better protected.‖ Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared With
Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1984). But society as
a whole will suffer because fewer goods and services will be produced. Id.
120
See e.g., Coates, supra note 29, at 92-96 (reporting that systemic fraud before
Sarbanes-Oxley increased costs for all firms, whether or not they engaged in fraud). The
systemic risk discount can be very large. Russian manufacturing companies privatized at a
99-percent discount, and Russian oil companies, similarly, were valued at a 99-percent
discount compared to Western firms. Some of the discount reflects the likelihood of
government expropriation, but some reflects the ability of Russian managers to divert
profits and assets to themselves. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 748 (1997).
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example, was a gluttonous consumer of financial (and human) capital,
amassing more than $60 billion of equity capital. Without fraud, that capital
would have gone elsewhere.
After fraud is unmasked, the effect on firms in the same industry is
more pronounced than the effect on equity markets generally. There is
evidence that a restatement, even one unaccompanied by an enforcement
action, has a statistically significant negative impact on the stock price of all
firms in the industry, not just the restating firm.
Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson’s study is a good example for the afterthe-fact effects of a (mere) restatement on stock-prices of non-restating
firms in the same industry.121 Gleason and her collaborators find that stockprices of rivals decline because of investors’ concerns with accounting
quality in that industry more generally. Not surprisingly, the authors find
that the effect is more pronounced when the restating firm is relatively large
and when restating and non-restating firms use the same external auditor.122
They also find that firms with high accruals—sales recorded before cash is
received, also known as accounts receivable—suffer greater losses than
those with relatively low accruals.123
Contagion is only one of several competing explanations for why rivals’
stock prices suffer declines after a restatement in the industry. Durnev and
Mangen observe that investment in the industry is depressed for a number
of years after a restatement. They argue that a restatement releases new
information about the prospects of the industry, which causes rivals’ to
reevaluate (and reduce) their own investment.124
By testing their hypotheses that rivals rely on their peers’ financial
statements and that restatements convey new information, Durnev and
Mangen find that rivals significantly reduce their investments within three
years after the restatement.125 A lower level of investment is not (solely) the
product of changed opportunities for external financing, investor concerns
about accounting quality, or subsequently higher cost of debt funding, as

121

Christi A. Gleason, Nicole Thorne Jenkins & W. Bruce Johnson, The Contagion
Effects of Accounting Restatements, 83 ACCT. REV. 83 (2008).
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Id. at 84.
123
Id. at 83. Accruals more accurately reflect the business prospects of a firm, but they
are less reliable than measuring sales by cash flow because management can exercise more
discretion in accounting for accruals.
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Durnev & Mangen, supra note 13, at 680-81 (2009).
125
Id. at 697 (finding that competitors on average reduce investments by 5.6% in the
year of the restatement, by 5.2% the following year, by 2.6% the year thereafter and by
16.2% in the third year after the restatement in the industry).

The Social Cost of Financial Misrepresentations

27

other studies would suggest.126 Rather, rivals reevaluate their expected
return from existing investments and reduce current investment in response.
Durnev and Mangen also confirm one aspect of other studies:
restatements have a greater impact on rivals’ investments when restating
firms have a larger market share.127 Both restating firms and their rivals
experience significant negative abnormal returns around the announcement
date—8.28% and 0.34% respectively. But the aggregate loss to rivals (and
their shareholders) is much greater than the harm to shareholders in the
restating firm: $581 million compared with $141 million.128
Goldman, Stefanescu, and Peyer confirm that fraud depresses stock
prices of rival firms.129 Looking only at restatements accompanied by an
SEC enforcement action, the authors find that rivals’ stock price on average
drops 2.34% around the date that fraud is unmasked.130 Declines are more
pronounced in competitive industries, while in the most concentrated
industries rivals’ stock prices on average increase after discovery of fraud.
The authors argue that rivals in competitive industries are less able to
capture the fraud firm’s market share, both because there are many similarly
situated firms vying for customers and because firms in competitive
industries are resource-constrained.131 In contrast, rivals in concentrated
industries can use their (product) market power to pass along the costs of
the shock to their customers (protecting their profits and their stock price),
while rivals in competitive industries cannot do so.132 Ultimately, aggregate
equity market losses from fraud to rival firms outstrip the losses to
shareholders of fraud firms by nearly an order of magnitude.133
b. Debt Market Cost
In addition to contagion and investment reconsideration, accounting
fraud increases the cost of debt for fraud firms and their rivals both before
and after fraud is unmasked.
126

Id. at 703.
Id. at 706.
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No empirical studies to date have estimated the debt-market distortion
during fraud. Assuming that the supply of capital is limited, fraud distorts
the allocation of debt between firms. As fraud firms appear healthier than
they really are, they can negotiate better borrowing terms than justified.
Conversely, non-fraud firms face relatively worse borrowing terms than
they would absent fraud.134 In a competitive market, higher costs of capital
translate into lower levels of investment by honest firms, likely depressing
their employment and their market share. Because fraud firms are riskier
than they appear, the net cost of misallocated debt capital (and labor, see
next section) is positive.
Files and Gurun study the ex post effect of fraud on the cost of debt for
restating firms and their rivals, suppliers, and customers. They reviewed the
loan terms of firms that borrowed within a year of a rivals’ restatement and
find that lenders increased loan costs by five to nine basis points.135 They
find similar effects when looking at loans to firms whose major suppliers or
customers restated their earnings.136 In addition to demanding a higher
interest rate, the lender was more likely to ask for collateral and impose
more restrictive financial covenants.137
The authors demonstrate that lenders overreact to misreporting within
the industry and along the supply chain: lenders tighten lending standards
on firms regardless of the firms’ accounting quality or overall economic
health.138 The authors argue that higher cost of borrowing is caused by
contagion,139 but additional explanations are possible. First, fraud often
leads to bankruptcy and only partial loan repayment. Banks face reserve
requirements, and a default reduces their ability to extend new credit.
Assuming that the supply of capital is not unlimited, the price of credit will
increase after fraud even in the absence of contagion. Second, fraud reveals
that the prospects of the industry are less rosy than previously believed, and
thus rivals’ and suppliers’ risk profile worse, even if they never engaged in
accounting improprieties themselves.
Files and Gurun report that lenders impose relatively stricter postrestatement loan terms in competitive industries than in concentrated
industries (measured by firms’ relative market shares).140 The authors
134
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attribute it to two factors: the fact that it is more difficult for firms in
competitive industries to capture the restating firm’s market share, and
contagion—the perception that firms in competitive industries are more
likely to mimic accounting practices of their peers.141 But there is another
possible explanation: firms in concentrated industries are able to pass the
cost of business shocks, like fraud, onto employees, suppliers, and
customers, and thus protect their profits.142 Knowing that, lenders demand a
lower risk premium.
c. Labor Market Cost
Financial misrepresentations distort the economic decisions that firms
and their employees make, and these decisions invariably affect labor
markets. To understand why labor markets might suffer, consider the
following. People respond to new information: financial misrepresentations,
accompanying reassuring statements, and firm behavior consistent with
reported financials induce both workers and rivals (as employers) to adjust
their actions to the reported reality.143
Employees who know a firm is tottering will look for new work long
before the end comes. Fraud upends employees’ ability to leave or demand
additional pay for the additional risk assumed, because fraud credibly
conveys to employees that the firm is doing better than it really is.144
Dishonest managers are aware of the risk of flight and try to reassure their
workers, just as they reassure providers of capital: they sell the lie to mask
fraud and to prevent employee exodus.145
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Id. at 21.
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Finding work is costly and time-consuming, certainly as compared with
the ability of investors to find alternative investments.146 When fraud is
unmasked, firms unravel quickly (certainly more quickly than most
business failure), exposing employees to unemployment. If they knew the
truth about the firm, employees could have looked for work sooner. In
addition, as their current job becomes less desirable in the eyes of potential
new employers, the workers become less desirable candidates for hire,
which further diminishes the odds of finding employment on equal terms.
Employees often make firm-specific investments that cannot be transferred
easily to another job and will be lost.147 Finally, when firms shed many
employees simultaneously, that extra supply will depress wages, at least
locally.
Fraud also distorts the allocation of labor between firms: it increases the
relative cost of labor for non-fraud firms, just as it increases their cost of
capital.148 The deadweight losses in labor markets caused by accounting
fraud should be greater than those in financial markets. Fraud in the
secondary market for securities misallocates shares among traders, but does
not misallocate equity financing between firms. In contrast, the market for
labor is a primary market. Fraud misallocates labor from a ―higher-value
use to a lower-value use [and thus] inflicts a deadweight loss on society in
every case.‖149
Finally, debt and equity investors can self-insure ex ante against
accounting fraud by lending to or investing in many different firms. While
diversification increases the odds that at least one of their investments will
be affected by fraud, it reduces the loss to their portfolio. Workers cannot
diversify their human capital. Accounting fraud by their employer affects
their entire human capital. For most, human capital constitutes a large
percentage of their wealth, so the loss will be substantial, even if the
displacement is only temporary.150 The loss is exacerbated if employees
also expect a company pension or invest in company stock.
Kedia and Philippon estimate the real economic costs of financial
misstatements to labor markets by examining a large sample of restating
146
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firms between January 1997 and June 2002, when about ten percent of all
listed firms restated their earnings at least once.151 They find that restating
firms hire and invest more than comparable firms during periods of
suspicious accounting, and reduce labor and borrowing, and sell capital
assets after the restatement.152 To maintain consistency between reported
numbers and their business operations, restating firms mimic firms that are
growing as fast as the numbers would suggest.153 The authors show that
overinvestment would not have been possible but for the financial
misrepresentation.154
The implications of the Kedia and Philippon study are significant.
Restating firms overhire and overinvest during the period of the
misrepresentation and reduce both labor and capital thereafter. The
subsequent decline is not offset by the earlier growth—it exceeds it and
exceeds substantially the trends in the economy. While all non-farm
payrolls increased by 6.7% between 1997 and 1999 and then declined by
1.5% in 2000 to 2002, employment in studied firms increased by 500,000
(25%) and then fell by 600,000.155
More troubling is that industries marred by restatements lost jobs
permanently, even where rivals were able to reclaim the restating firms’
market share. Instead of expanding their employment and investment to
compensate for the losses of restating firms, rivals, too, report negative
employment and investment growth, coupled with strong labor productivity
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growth compared with non-restating firms in more honest industries.156
However, increased labor productivity was not offset by higher wages.157
This picture would not be complete without acknowledging that the
effects of fraud vary depending on the demand for labor in a particular
market. Enron’s employees had a rough time after the firm revealed its
accounting improprieties. Employees had firm-specific skills. When the
firm disappeared, so did some of the markets it created (wholesale energy
and transmission trading), and with them, the demand for labor.
Arthur Andersen, Enron’s auditor, imploded very quickly after it was
indicted for destroying evidence of fraud. Yet the harm to the Arthur
Andersen’s auditors from the implosion was relatively minor. Their skills
were easily transferrable and their firm-specific investment small.
Moreover, the accounting industry boomed after the scandals and demand
for auditors soared. While a number of Andersen audit partners retired in
the aftermath of scandal, other auditors were gobbled up by the remaining
Big Four accounting firms.158 Most equity partners were made whole as
they changed firms and lower echelons usually retained their seniority, but
not in every case.159
d. Cost to Product Markets
Accounting fraud misallocates capital and labor between firms, but also
distorts product markets. Fraud firms overinvest in fixed assets and adopt
inefficient pricing to mask the fraud, to which their rivals respond. Unless
the fraud firm operates a monopoly without complements or substitutes, its
pricing or quantity decisions—distorted to correspond with fraudulent
financial reporting—will affect product markets.160
Using WorldCom fraud as a case study, Sadka finds support for this
hypothesis. While it was misreporting its financials, WorldCom charged
low prices, increasing its market share.161 Its competitors, Sprint and
AT&T, responded by cutting their prices, and saw a substantial decline in
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their operating margins.162 Bower and Gilson estimate that if WorldCom
had set prices according to its real earnings, the industry could have
generated an additional $40 billion in profit.163 Consumers might benefit
from product market distortions in the short-term. But if fraud bankrupts an
entire industry, consumers are harmed in the long run, especially if the
goods are durable.164
Alternately, fraud might ―work‖ and allow the firm to cement a
dominant position in the industry. Waste Management, a company that
―fostered a culture of fraudulent accounting,‖ was charged with fraud not
once, but twice.165 Yet it survived relatively unscathed and today dominates
the market for solid waste removal, often charging monopolistic prices for
its services—great for its shareholders, less so for consumers.
Dechow and her collaborators confirm empirically that fraud firms
generally increase their scale during fraud.166 But, the size of the increase
depends on the competitiveness of the industry. Fraud substantially distorts
non-competitive product markets and produces billions of dollars in
deadweight losses, as World-Com and its impact on the telecommunications
industry demonstrate.167 In truly competitive markets where price is set by
marginal cost, managers cannot easily expand their firm’s market share
either by lowering prices or increasing sales. If they do, they will quickly
bankrupt the firm and fraud will be exposed. Fraud in competitive industries
might also be easier to detect, in particular if financial statements of rivals
are highly comparable.168 Product market competition thus affects the size
of the distortion from fraud, but not its existence: one firm’s change in price
or output will always shift the equilibrium and affect the prices or output of
other firms’ products.169
But, even truly competitive markets do not police fraud effectively all
the time. First, investment booms dampen the constraints that managers in
competitive industries usually face. Easy money causes firms in competitive
162
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industries to both overinvest and to misrepresent their financials.170 As
fraud firms report record profits and growth, honest rivals follow the
perceived industry trend.171 Similarly, providers of capital rely on the
perceived growth during a boom and pour money into firms without
adequately assessing whether present and future profits are real or not.172
Second, very few product markets are in fact perfectly competitive. And
finally, most firms operate in multiple product markets, some of which
might be competitive while others concentrated, which further dampens the
market constraint of competition.
e. Other Costs
Finally, fraud distorts government policy, reduces the tax base, and
harms communities.
Government often bases policy on required disclosures. Sidak argues
that WorldCom’s fraud distorted government policy, in addition to
wreaking havoc on the firm’s rivals.173 Quoting former FCC Chairman
Michael K. Powell, Sidak notes that federal and state governments use
disclosures to set regulatory fees, determine interstate access charges for
telecommunications, set rates for unbundled services, evaluate whether the
division of federal-state jurisdiction is proper, and perform many other
activities.174
When fraud results in business exit or reduces profits and incomes, all
levels of government suffer from reduced tax revenues and increased
demand for social spending. A large firm’s failure or retrenchment causes
disproportionate impacts on the community in which it is located. After
Enron declared bankruptcy and several other local companies reported
fraud, Houston, an otherwise prosperous and growing city, experienced a
recession that was both longer and deeper than the national recession.175
Houston’s unemployment rate, which is generally lower than the national
average, increased in early 2002 (Enron declared bankruptcy in December
170

See Gerard Hoberg & Gordon Phillips, Real and Financial Industry Booms and
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2001) and remained between 0.5 and 1 percent above the national average
until late 2006.176 The Houston economy is dependent on oil prices and
rises and falls with the price of crude. From 2000 to 2006, the price of crude
tripled, and so Houston should have boomed.177
C. Determinants of the Social Cost’s Magnitude
Not all accounting frauds are created equal. Some firms are more likely
to misrepresent their performance than others, and some financial
misrepresentations are more harmful than others. This section briefly
explains what factors increase the likelihood that a firm will commit fraud.
It then analyzes what factors might increase the social welfare effects of
each occurrence of fraud.
1. Likelihood of Fraud
The observed prevalence of fraud produces a biased estimate of its
actual prevalence, and there is evidence that many frauds go undetected.178
Nevertheless, some observations are worth noting. Larger firms are more
likely to face an SEC enforcement action for earnings manipulation: the
largest 10.0% of firms by market capitalization accounted for 14.7% of SEC
enforcement actions for fraud between 1982 and 2005, while the smallest
decile featured in 5.1% of accounting and auditing enforcement releases
(―AAERs‖).179 Greater visibility and scrutiny might explain more detection
among the larger firms, but their ability to afford the best auditors should
mitigate against fraud in the first place.
Firms in growth industries, like computer software and hardware, retail
and services, and those with substantial investments in intangible assets also
are more likely to commit accounting fraud than firms in stable industries
with substantial fixed assets (such as refining or utilities).180 Firms with
high P/E ratios, those seeking to raise new capital and those where
176
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managers’ pay is more closely-linked to stock-price performance relative to
rivals’ performance also are more likely to misstate their financials.181
Finally, economists generally believe that product market competition
should reduce the firms’ proclivity for fraud because it reduces agency
costs,182 but the relationship ―is not as easy to formalize as one might
think.‖183 Wang and Winton find evidence that there is a kernel of truth to
the notion: firms in competitive industries during periods of normal growth
are generally about half as likely as their peers in concentrated industries to
commit fraud.184 The effect is most pronounced in those competitive
industries where financial statements are highly comparable: each firm’s
disclosure provides information about other firms’ financial disclosures.185
If a manager misrepresents the firm’s earnings, outsiders can more easily
detect that the disclosure is false by comparing it with the disclosures of
honest rivals.186
During periods of growth, however, the propensity of oligopolies for
fraud remains unchanged, while in competitive industries the likelihood of
fraud quadruples (as compared with its normal rate), and exceeds that of
firms in concentrated industries.187 Periods of growth eliminate the
constraints that competitive product markets ordinarily impose. The
combination of easy money and a need for external financing to increase
capacity creates a powerful incentive to misrepresent financials.188
Misrepresentations that paint a rosier picture than true further spur
overinvestment in capacity. The bust that inevitably follows exposes both
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the fraud and the overinvestment, leading to business failure and significant
distortion in product markets as well as markets for productive inputs.189
2. Size of the Distortion from Fraud
Several factors affect the costliness of each financial misrepresentation:
(a) size, duration and type of the misrepresentation; (b) characteristics of the
fraud firm, and (c) characteristics of the markets in which the fraud firm
operates.
a. Fraud Characteristics
A number of studies suggest that duration affects the social cost of
fraud: the longer fraud remains undetected, the greater the distortion.190
Even though a single-period misrepresentation can inflate the stock price
substantially, persistent misrepresentations distort economic decisions
more.191
Yu and Yu find evidence that firms’ political spending delays discovery
of fraud. They report that fraud persists longer and is less likely to be
detected if the firm lobbies that if it does not. Moreover, they find that firms
spend more on lobbying while the fraud is ongoing, both, compared with
non-fraud lobbying peers and compared with their own lobbying
expenditures before fraud.192
The type of the misrepresentation matters also. Rivals, suppliers, and
large customers are more likely to use and rely on a misstatement of core
189
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accounts, such as revenues, sales, market share, and cost of goods sold, than
on the firm’s pension fund returns.
The size of the misrepresentation, and not just its duration or type,
increases the distortion, but the correlation is weaker.193 A quantitatively
large financial misstatement can substantially inflate the value of the
company and distort capital and labor market allocation, as well as the
firm’s product market decisions. The discovery of fraud immediately causes
the stock price to fall substantially, lenders to accelerate their loans, and
customers to flee, which might lead to insolvency.194 The large size also
suggests that management was aware of the misstatement, further
increasing the capital-market penalty, and causing a larger post-fraud
adjustment in business activities.195 The notion that large frauds are worse
than small frauds produced the rule-like quantitative standard that a
financial misstatement is immaterial unless it misrepresented net income by
more than five percent.196 (That standard has since been replaced with a
qualitative standard for materiality of a financial misstatement.)197
b. Fraud Firm Characteristics
Relative firm size affects the social cost of financial misrepresentations.
Rivals are more likely to rely on and copy dominant firms’ behavior than
they are to copy smaller firms, including their business and investment
decisions as well as their accounting practices.198 Similarly, accounting
fraud in concentrated industries is more likely to distort rivals’ economic
behavior.199 Fraud in industries with low barriers to entry will encourage
inefficient business entry, increasing the social cost from fraud.200 Finally,
193
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the cost to non-shareholders is greater if the firm files for bankruptcy, in
particular if the firm was otherwise viable.
c. Market Characteristics
The effect of competition in the markets for inputs and outputs on the
social cost of fraud is complicated.201 Product market competition affects
the likelihood that a firm’s managers will commit fraud.202 Many rivals in
an industry also reduce the likelihood that fraud by any single firm distorts
substantially economic decisions by rivals, but fraud by a non-negligible
number of rivals would produce a distortion, just like fraud by a single firm
in a concentrated industry.203 In addition, market concentration affects the
size of the distortion from fraud as fraud firms change their pricing and
output.204
Fraud can also affect the size of the product market itself and can either
increase demand for the particular good or service, or decrease it. Demand
for audit, legal, and consulting services often increases after financial
scandals. Demand for other goods and services might decrease, in
correlation with the slowed (or negative) rate of economic growth and
higher rates of unemployment that sometimes follow financial scandals.
The more interesting effect of competition is that it affects who
ultimately bears the cost of fraud. The conventional wisdom assumes that
investors as residual owners bear the bulk of the cost of fraud. But this
conclusion is true only for firms in truly competitive industries, and in truly
competitive, perfectly informed, and frictionless markets for labor, capital,
and products. In all other cases—the vast majority—fraud firms and their
rivals are able to shield their profits (and their stock price) and pass along
the cost of business shocks from the more competitive market for securities
to the relatively less competitive markets for inputs and outputs.205
Peress finds support for the relative competitiveness hypothesis in the
product markets: firms use market power to pass on shocks to customers
and insulate profits.206 Kedia and Philippon show that rivals shift some of
201
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the post-disclosure cost of fraud onto employees,207 and Files and Gurun
suggest that the lack of product market competition enables borrowers to
negotiate better terms than their peers in more competitive industries.208
Finally, as the studies cited in Part II indicate, it would be wrong to
argue that a few bad apples cause the bulk of the social cost of fraud and
that accounting fraud is rarely costly for non-shareholders. Most studies
report median losses and overall losses to restating firms and their
competitors, not just losses in aberrant cases like Enron or WorldCom.
While it is true that Enron caused greater harm than fraud in, say, SeaView
Video Technology, Inc.—a firm with 20 employees that overstated its
earnings by $1.8 million209—the studies demonstrate that even (mere)
restatements cause real economic harm to non-shareholders.
III. MISSING THE BIGGER PICTURE
As recently as 2003, Lev observed that no-one has tackled the important
issue of what ―social harm is caused by earnings manipulations,‖210 even
though it is ―undoubtedly very consequential.‖211 If the central premise
adopted by commentators is so obviously wrong, why has no-one noticed
it? Why is there still a $20 bill lying on the sidewalk for this author to pick
it up? A combination of history and intellectual path dependence, a change
in the nature of securities fraud, and disciplinal blindness is the culprit.
A. History
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits accounting fraud
in the secondary markets, responded to a particular abuse of the late 1920s.
At the time, Congress understood the crash of 1929 to have been caused by
market manipulation, and so the newly drafted laws focused on one
identified problem and reached a specific, and narrow, conclusion about
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solutions.212 The Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act, and the newlycreated SEC aimed to prevent investors from being ―unfairly robbed of their
investments.‖213 Framed as corrective justice, Section 13 of the Exchange
Act requires public firms to disclose information to investors at regular
intervals.214 Complementing Section 13, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
prohibits making fraudulent statements in connection with securities
trading, and authorizes the SEC to pursue violators.215
By 1934, that interpretation is hardly the only, or even most reasonable,
conclusion about the harm from the 1929 stock-market crash. Given the
economic dislocation of the Great Depression, New Deal lawmakers could
have focused on the macroeconomic impact of disruption to financial
markets. The financial sector exists to channel savings to firms. Distortions
in these markets disrupt that process and weaken allocative efficiency.
Therefore, the utmost concern of regulation would be in preserving capital
markets as conduits of the lifeblood of the economy, and regulate them as a
utility.216
Alternately, lawmakers could have adopted a retributive approach and
focused on the wrongdoers. They could have concluded that it is immoral
for the dishonest to benefit from their misdeeds, and decided that the
purpose of government is to reward virtue and punish vice. In that universe,
one can imagine yet another set of laws that largely ignored whether fraud
inflicted any harm, against whom, and how much.
But, the Exchange Act did not adopt retribution or allocative efficiency
as its raison d’être. Instead, it focused on investor protection and so
commentators have studied regulatory changes and new enforcement
approaches through that lens. This produced what generously can be called
intellectual path dependence: the stated goal of the rules determines how the
rules are analyzed, and subsequent commentators respond to the work of
those coming before them. In a universe where only investors are harmed
by fraud, the really thorny issues (unsurprisingly) revolve around showing
212
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that fraud in fact harmed investors. These issues have generated a series of
Supreme Court opinions that first, expanded and then severely limited
private rights of action,217 spurred a slew of laws and regulations designed
to fix the perceived problem,218 and produced a rich academic literature
analyzing these decisions or proposing new securities laws.219
B. The Changed Nature of Securities Fraud
A second, and complementary, explanation for the scholarship’s blind
spot is that the nature of securities fraud has changed since the Exchange
Act was adopted. Stock pools, secret loans, undisclosed profit-sharing
plans, self-dealing contracts, and insider trading, in fact, largely harm
investors.220 The distortion of real economic decisions caused by the
inflated stock price is relatively small.
Unable to self-deal and trade on inside information with impunity,
dishonest managers have innovated. Today, accounting fraud is the most
common species in the genus of securities fraud and it differs from
manipulative stock pools in one important respect. While accounting fraud
usually inflates the stock price, the effect is achieved not through managers’
stock market activities, but through the release of false information, which
affects the stock price indirectly. It is the false disclosure that causes both,
the economic distortion and an inflated stock price, while the fraud is
ongoing and thereafter.221
After the 1930s, the stock market took decades to recover and, when it
finally did, it continued to stagnate while the larger economy prospered.
Although equities did well in the 1960s, the market really took off in the
mid-1980s. The stock-market growth, coupled with managerial incentives
that are closely tied to the firms’ stock-price and a greater willingness of
directors to remove managers for subpar performance, produced a powerful
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incentive to manage earnings and misrepresent the financial health of the
firm.222
As the nature of securities fraud has changed from market manipulation
to financial misrepresentations, the nature of the social harm that fraud
causes also has changed. As Part II elaborates in greater detail, financial
misrepresentations produce costs even if not a single share changes hands
during the fraud period.223 Because stock trading is highly liquid and
transactions frequent, there will always be some shareholders who are
harmed when a firm misreports its performance. But the focus on investors
and their losses has limited the scope of analysis, as well as the universe of
both, tools available to regulators and remedies to those injured by
accounting fraud.224
C. Blinders of the Discipline
Empirical investigation and the consequent theoretical implications are
driven by data availability. Stock prices are readily available and thus often
studied; opportunity costs to employees much less so. The dearth of studies
may have led economists and legal academics alike to assume that the costs
of distortions to non-shareholders are small and to rely on the stock price as
the correct measure of the social welfare effects of fraud.225
Nevertheless, the broader economic effects of fraud in Enron,
WorldCom and their sisters-in-crime have been widely discussed in the
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media,226 and even by the SEC.227 Perhaps Enron and WorldCom were
perceived as outliers and not representative of the sample of all
misreporting firms. Or, even if commentators accepted the fact that frauds
destroy more than just equity, they usually noted that regulation aimed at
preventing fraud imposes cost on all firms, honest and dishonest. While the
notion is accurate, it is incomplete: fraud, too, imposes costs on honest
firms (and their stakeholders) through resource misallocation and contagion.
But just like stock-price declines after fraud, the costs of compliance with
regulation designed to prevent fraud are very visible, in particular to
corporate managers. The cost of resource misallocation and contagion,
however, would be very difficult to calculate: one would need to know the
counterfactual in the absence of fraud. And so, it is easier to attribute a
stock-market decline, tighter credit, and unemployment to the business
cycle rather than fraud.
Economic modeling, a popular economic method frequently used by
securities law scholars, further exacerbates the tendency to underestimate
the cost of fraud. While it is a useful analytical tool, economic modeling
has a serious limitation: if a variable is missing from the model or if the
value assigned to it is incorrect (e.g., assigning zero value to variables that
are difficult to estimate),228 the model will produce a result that is wrong.
The more complex the system studied, the greater the risk of omission or
error. The effects of financial misrepresentations are broad, varied, and
often difficult to quantify precisely, and our understanding of the workings
of a complex and dynamic system like the economy quite limited.
Finally, academics may be experts in their field, but are often unaware
of the work of other disciplines (or even sub-fields within the same
discipline). For example, efforts to define independence as it pertains to
corporate directors, administrative agencies, and central banks have
occupied scholars in these different areas for decades, yet there has been no
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cross-pollination between them.229 ―Lessons learned through decades of
research in one field can be lost to those struggling with the same concepts
in another.‖230 Similarly, it appears that securities law scholars have missed
the lessons about fraud that accounting scholars have learned over the last
decade.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Financial misrepresentations impose social cost above and beyond that
suffered by shareholders of the fraud-committing firm because they (1)
distort that firm’s decisions as managers try to mask their fraud; (2)
interfere with rivals’ ability to learn from fraud firm’s disclosures; (3)
induce socially-wasteful investments by creditors, employees, and other
stakeholders (such as vendors, suppliers) while fraud is ongoing; (4)
produce contagion and a costly adjustment to new information after fraud is
unmasked; and (5) cause bankruptcies. The cost of false disclosures is not
borne only by investors as securities laws assume. Rather, most victims of
accounting fraud lack remedies under existing law.
Combined, these five claims lead to several tentative conclusions for
fraud regulation and enforcement. Accurate disclosures have characteristics
of a public good, and so public regulation is preferable to private ordering.
Harms caused by false disclosures are dispersed, and thus public
enforcement is preferable to private rights of action and market solutions.
Much of the analysis that follows is a thought experiment, and specific
recommendations are beyond the scope of this Article.
The study on the social cost of financial misrepresentations also sheds
light on and breathes new life into the mostly dead debate about shareholder
primacy. If fraud produces costs external to the fraud firm, than improved
corporate governance alone cannot further the public interest. The Article
does not quibble with the conclusion of shareholder primacy proponents
that managers should run firms in the interest of shareholders. But, it favors
significantly more aggressive public regulation and enforcement of fraud,
(and of other corporate activities that harm non-shareholders) than do
proponents of shareholder primacy.
A. Implications for Fraud Prevention, Regulation, and Enforcement

229

Peter Conti-Brown & Ronald J. Gilson, The Limits of Independence in Institutional
Design, at 6 (on file with author) (providing a unified field theory of independence).
230
Id. at 6.

46

The Social Cost of Financial Misrepresentations

First, false disclosures cause intra-firm harms to shareholders and nonshareholders, as well as external harms to rivals, suppliers, vendors,
distributors, lenders, and their constituents.231 Thus, reforms to corporate
governance that are designed to empower shareholders are destined to
disappoint as fraud-prevention tools because shareholders lack the proper
incentives to implement optimal disclosure and compliance mechanisms.232
Shareholders can partly self-insure against the firm-specific risk of fraud by
diversifying their holdings. They reap the rewards before fraud is unmasked
as their firms cement ―dominant positions in rapidly expanding, lucrative
markets.‖ Only if the fraud is exposed, do they lose part of their investment,
but their downside risk is limited and largely diversifiable.233 Often, they
can shift at least some of the cost of fraud onto others.234
In both Enron and WorldCom, the poster children for accounting fraud,
the harm to shareholders was fairly dispersed. Institutional investors owned
most shares, so losses to any individual institution were small and
represented only tiny portions of their portfolios.235 Employees, particularly
those with pensions in Enron stock, rivals, and communities bore much of
the risk that they could not diversify away effectively.236
Shareholders also suffer from ―collective myopia‖ that makes them
focus on the stock price: it is difficult for outside shareholders to gauge
whether the firm is making sound, long-term investments, but ―easy to see
whether the stock price went up today.‖237 Managers’ focus on the short
term, sometimes manifesting as financial manipulation, reflects shareholder
preferences. And so, increased shareholder power is not the answer to the
problem, it ―is the problem.‖238 The final reason that firm-level fraud
231
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232
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prevention tools, such as corporate governance reforms, are destined to
disappoint is that the cost of fraud is not contained within the fraud firm, but
spreads to other firms and to markets for input and output. Even if firms
were to take into account all intra-firm costs of false disclosures (or if the
firm’s stakeholders could protect themselves effectively through contract),
they would be willing to spend less than socially optimal to prevent
fraud.239
Second, the push to water down fraud regulation and scale back
enforcement, motivated by the high cost of compliance for investors is,
likewise, misguided. Shareholders are a poor yardstick: if rational, they
would prefer that managers commit less fraud than more (but only up to a
point). But, if some fraud is inevitable, rational shareholders would prefer
that it never be unmasked because they avoid the large reputational penalty
that accompanies disclosure. Others however, suffer from greater
distortions the longer fraud goes on undetected.
Third, harms from fraud are widely dispersed among many different
markets and market participants. As a result, no single private party (or
class of private parties) has optimal incentives to prevent fraud: not
investors,240 not exchanges,241 and not analysts and others who trade on
information they have gathered.242
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Most private parties who suffer from fraud are not able to use contracts
effectively.243 Contracting is itself costly. Contracts that are not performed
immediately require monitoring, in particular where one contracting party
controls access to information. While large creditors usually have access to
proprietary information about the firm and can charge higher interest rates
or demand collateral when the risk of fraud appears higher,244 other
stakeholders, such as employees and suppliers, may lack the information
and the negotiating power to protect themselves adequately.245 Many
workers find it ―difficult, if not impossible, to verify employers’ or potential
employers’ statements with regard to the safety of the workplace, job
security, or certain employment benefits,‖ let alone fraud.246 Private sector
unions are as weak as they have been since the Gilded Era.247 Creditors,
large and small, usually can reduce their firm-specific risk of fraud by
diversifying, just like investors. Employees, unsecured (i.e., tort), and trade
creditors cannot easily diversify. In addition, coordination problems impede
contractual remedies by employees and unsecured and trade creditors.
Finally, employees or unsecured creditors could demand higher pay, but
that will reduce demand for their work and services, and constrict economic
activity.248
Rivals cannot use contract, but they could, in general, rely less on their
peers’ financial statements (a costly proposition as reliable information
about the business environment is costly to obtain), particularly when those
statements appear too good to be true. But that is exactly the problem with
accounting fraud. If it is to work, it must be convincing. The best frauds
were ―successful‖ precisely because managers were able to fool the many
markets in which the firm operated that their statements were truthful, and
243
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thus their business decisions worth copying. And even if rivals did doubt a
fraud firms’ numbers, their own shareholders and market analysts might
push them toward fudging their numbers.249
If ex ante private ordering is an ineffective tool to internalize the cost of
fraud, ex post private remedies are worse. Even if everyone harmed by
financial misrepresentations had standing to sue, harm from each incident
may be difficult to calculate and prove. Moreover, increasing the number of
potential plaintiffs would not increase the pot from which to draw their
compensation. Many have criticized the shareholder class action250 and this
Article joins them in disapproval, but for reasons very different from those
usually given: the remedy is limited to the victims best able to self-insure
against fraud and least deserving of compensation.251 Assuming that the
purpose of private actions is not compensation, but deterrence, the securities
fraud class action could be justified if shareholders were better monitors
than other potential plaintiffs (such as employees or rivals). But, in the one
study to date, the authors found that employees reported 19% of frauds,
while shareholders discovered only 3.2% of frauds.252
And fourth, because false disclosures distort markets across state lines,
fraud should be regulated and enforced federally (or even internationally),
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not at the state level as some have proposed.253 Regulatory competition for
securities law among states would not produce optimal fraud regulation in a
healthy race to the top.254 Rather, small states with few local businesses and
employees, like Delaware or Nevada, could externalize the cost of fraud
onto larger states, while collecting registration fees.
All of these factors suggest that public provision of honest governance
through public enforcement and regulation should produce superior
outcomes than private ordering and litigation. This Article recognizes that
public regulation and enforcement are no panacea. Public agencies usually
lack the resources and the political backing needed to regulate and
prosecute fraud vigorously. Public enforcement actions remain rare, in
particular against large and complex firms.255 But, given the nature and the
size of the cost of fraud, even massive government failure would likely
regulate fraud better than ―the market.‖
Public regulation faces challenges other than politics. The Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act both invoke the ―public interest‖ as a
rationale for regulation, with the goal of ―promot[ing] efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.‖256 The U.S. Supreme Court has only
been asked once to interpret that language, and has understood it to refer to
competition in securities markets.257 Although the Court’s decision was
predicated on the facts of the case before it, it is unclear in its aftermath that
253
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the SEC has the authority to regulate to protect non-investors and promote
social welfare.258
Moreover, it is unclear whether the SEC is the proper regulator and that
it is willing to regulate in favor of non-investors, since that would require
balancing competing interests of investors and non-investors. But, given the
opposition the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has faced, this Article
does not propose creating a separate agency to prosecute fraud with an eye
on protecting non-shareholders. Even if a new agency could be created,
coordination problems, turf wars and cost might outweigh any benefit of
improved fraud deterrence.259
Unlike the SEC, there is no doubt under existing law that prosecutors
and judges can take into account harms to non-shareholders. Once a
defendant has been found or pleaded guilty, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines allow judges to take into consideration total economic harm
caused by the offense.260 But, criminal enforcement is costly and inevitably
rarely used.261 Opponents of tough enforcement also argue that draconian
criminal sanctions will cause managers to steer clear of potentially lucrative
business activities, rendering criminal sanctions necessarily inefficient.262
But, complex fraud might be impossible to investigate without the tools
available to prosecutors, including wiretaps and cooperation agreements. In
particular when levied against individuals, from a strict deterrence
258
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perspective, criminal sanctions might be the best existing tool we have to
fight fraud.
If securities laws could be changed, how should they be changed to
reflect the observations put forth in this Article? For one, fraud duration is
an important determinant in the size of the social cost of fraud. Any
mechanism that would prevent fraud or reduce the lag between the
commission of fraud and its unmasking would also reduce the distortion to
real economic markets.
For reporting companies, strengthening independent auditing looks like
a promising line of defense against fraud. Recently, independent agencies in
the United States and the European Union have proposed increasing auditor
independence and requiring more detailed and nuanced audit reports.263
In addition, severing the agency relationship between management, who
selects the auditor, provides information, and pays for the audit, and the
auditor ought to reduce the conflict of interest and improve audit quality.264
Forensic audits are expensive and time-consuming, but effective. About
one-third of firms charged with accounting fraud end in bankruptcy,265 and
of the firms that file for bankruptcy, about a third is found to have
committed fraud before filing.266 This suggests that courts reviewing
bankruptcy petitions should routinely look for fraud.267 In addition, forensic
audits could be conducted outside of bankruptcy or scandal, either randomly
or when certain red flags are raised.268 For example, accounting studies
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suggest that certain accounting practices signal fraud, such as high and/or
spiking accruals.269
As the Article suggests, non-reporting companies’ market behavior, if
observable, but based on fraud, is also distorting. As noted, the distortion is
greater if the firm is large, fraud is long-lasting, and the product market
concentrated (or competitive during investment booms). And so, closer
oversight is warranted in concentrated industries and during bubbles.
Providing employees and others with incentives to come forward with
information about financial misrepresentations also could reduce the
duration of fraud. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act adopted fairly anemic
whistleblower protections that barred employers from retaliating against
whistleblowers. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 went further and authorized
monetary awards for whistleblowers whose tips lead to a successful SEC
enforcement action.270 While promising, the whistleblower must jump
through many hoops to collect anything. First, the award is conditional on
the SEC successfully pursuing the enforcement action. SEC has a long
history of neglecting whistleblower tips. More importantly, the agency is
always starved for resources. It has recently announced that it would delay
establishing an office to handle whistleblower claims because of resource
constraints.271 Since employees often have better access to information
about fraud than others, and discover and report it frequently even without
incentives, even more robust incentives than the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
awards are warranted.272
Finally, the elements of liability for securities fraud could be modified
to facilitate enforcement. For example, the standard of care for financial
disclosures under the Exchange Act could be changed from recklessness to
negligence (akin to Sections 11 or 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act), allowing
a public agency to initiate an enforcement action whenever it believed a
firm failed to live up to that standard. Given the nature of ripple effects
from fraud, however, shareholders’ right of action should not be
expanded—if anything, it should be limited in exchange for more public
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enforcement as Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter recently proposed, or
given to employees.273
Although legislative change is unlikely, modifications to securities laws
that do not primarily aim to protect investors are not without precedent.274
As Professor Langevoort observed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ―refused
shareholders any more governance power, either in terms of voting rights
. . . or private litigation.‖275 Instead, according to Langevoort, the SarbanesOxley Act was motivated by ―social and economic dislocation, not simply
investor losses,‖ and its requirements for effective compliance mechanisms
and independent directors reflect that concern.276
Fraud regulation might have ―perverse unintended consequences‖ that
some of its detractors fear.277 But, the cost of these consequences must be
weighed against the true social cost of fraud, not just investors’ losses.
Finding the right amount of regulation depends on knowing the
unknowable—the social cost of prevented frauds—but this Article suggests
that the balance ought to be in favor of more regulation and enforcement
rather than less.
A. Implications for Competing Theories of the Firm
By the end of the 1990s, a consensus developed among academic,
business, and governmental elites in dominant jurisdictions that corporate
managers should run corporations exclusively in the economic interest of
the shareholders,278 which ended the decades-long debate initiated by Adolf
Berle and Merrick Dodd.279 Others interested in the enterprise, including
creditors, suppliers, employees, and customers can protect their interests
273
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contractually or through regulation, not by participating in corporate
governance.280 Not only would shareholder primacy lead to superior
corporate governance, but would also maximize social welfare: everyone is
better off if managers run firms for the benefit of the shareholders.
Not everyone agrees with the dominant view: notably Kent Greenfield,
Margaret Blair, and Lynn Stout have advocated for a broader view of
corporate management’s duties, including to bondholders, creditors,
employees, and communities.281 Greenfield argues that workers as workers
(and because their pension is invested in corporate stock) ought to have a
role in director elections, and that corporate directors should owe workers
fiduciary duties.282 Blair and Stout take an even broader view, arguing that
corporate directors ought to govern for all corporate constituents that makefirm specific investments, including shareholders and stakeholders.283
While sympathetic to the progressive view, this Article suggests that
neither side is right. Shareholder primacy proponents argue that nonshareholders protect themselves with contracts and regulation. But, rivals
and their constituents have no contractual relationship with the fraud firm
and thus cannot use contracts to protect themselves against the cost of fraud
in other firms. Moreover, the political process has produced remedies for
fraud that are costly, but neither very effective at fraud deterrence nor at
compensating the victims (but lucrative for lawyers and elites): securities
class actions and independent boards. Investor-centric ideology has
weakened public institutions to the point that they are ridiculed for
failure.284 Progressives, on the other hand, proposed that the interests of
non-shareholders be protected within the firm: corporate boards ought to
take into account employees and other firm constituents in governance. But
progressives, too, do not include rivals and their constituents as factors in
decision-making. Any firm-centric governance solution will necessarily
produce too much fraud.
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Instead of placing inordinate trust into the hands of firms, their
managers and directors, this Article advocates that we recognize that honest
governance is a public good, to be reinforced through public means.
CONCLUSION
The prevailing model for assessing the social cost of financial
misrepresentations limits its scope to the costs suffered by investors. Since
investors as a class can self-insure through diversification against the firmspecific risk of fraud, their net losses approximate zero, unless the
frequency of fraud increases over time. Capital market efficiency may
suffer, but, again, the harm from accounting fraud is usually small, because
capital market efficiency does not depend on who owns shares in any given
firm.
This Article aims to redirect the debate to a more complete
understanding of social cost. Unlike stock price manipulations that divert
equity from one firm to another, financial misrepresentations mislead rivals,
creditors, vendors, suppliers, and employees, all of whom rely on financial
disclosures in making economic decisions. False disclosures distort real
markets, including those for debt and labor, and product markets. Empirical
evidence suggests that the social cost of financial misrepresentations to nonshareholders is substantial and ought to be taken into account in both,
regulation and enforcement. Because the social cost of financial
misrepresentations is significant and the harm dispersed among a variety of
stakeholders and firms, public enforcement actions (including imposing
criminal sanctions) against fraud-committing managers, coupled with
strengthened early detection mechanisms, may ultimately prove to be the
most effective and efficient mechanism for bringing the levels of fraud to
socially optimal.

